INTRODUCTION
Good corporate governance (GCG) is a concept that emphasizes the importance of stockholders having a right and accurate information on time. It also shows the responsibility of the company to present all information about the financial states accurately, on time and transparently. Because of that, public or small companies need to see GCG, not as accessories, but to improve the performance and value of the company (Tjager, 2003) . Corporate governance is a key element to improve the economic efficiency, which includes relationships between the company's management, the board of commissioners, stockholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate Governance also facilitates the company to choose their goals, and as a tool to decide the monitoring technique for the performance of a corporate governance that can create a conducive relation and can be accountable inside the element of a company to elevate the performance of a company. In this paradigm, the board of commissioners is in a position to make sure the management has worked for the sake of the company according to its strategy and to help the stockholders in terms of increasing the economic value of the company. Referring to the fact that corporate governance has been a hot topic since the publication about frauds in a company or bankruptcy that happen because of the management's fault, this creates a question about the adequacy of corporate governance. Corporate governance of bank industry in some developing countries such as Indonesia after the monetary crisis becomes much more important because of several reasons. First, banks have a dominant place in the economic system, especially as a growth economy machine (King & Levine, 1993) . Second, in countries that have been labelled not developing by the stock market, banks have a role to support the company financially. Third, banks are the centre of mobilizing national saving. Fourth, liberalization of the banking system through private or economic deregulation can make bank managers have the power to operate banks (Arun & Turner, 2004) .
It is based on the growth of Regional Development Banks across Indonesia which continues to be committed and appear to be leaders in their respective regions. This commitment is even stronger since the declaration of BPD Regional Champion (BRC) by Bank of Indonesia through 23 packages of monetary policy and banking on December 21, 2010. Regional development banks continually transform in order to escape from the shadows of national banks and become the motor for economic growth in the region. Most of BPDs have been trying to expand the network of offices or opening some micro-credits stores. Up to December 2014, there were 4,833 all BPD in Indonesia service offices, with a total number of 3,895 of ATM cash machine. Tangible results of the seriousness of the BPD to the Regional Champion can be viewed from various aspects of BPD performance that continues to increase. Within the last 5 years, the performance of BPD in terms of the financial and operational performance has increased. It can be seen from the various indicators recorded by BPD throughout Indonesia. In 2015, BPD assets have reached Rp. 547.82 trillion; an increase of 18.76% compared to the position in 2014, that is, Rp. 461.28 trillion, placing BPD to the fourth rank in Indonesia.
BPD ownership is dominated by the local government, provincial and district governments. BPD is a bank that has operational areas at the regional level, and therefore BPD understands better the potentials that exist in the area and this makes the scope of regional economic growth is heavily influenced by the performance of BPD. According to Darwanto (2012) , BPD has several problems including limited products and services, lack of human resources, lack of partnership and lack of capital. Therefore, the application of the concept of good corporate governance in BPD is expected to minimize the risk and overcome the problems in BPD and to increase the performance of BPD. The board role in corporate governance has become important to banks and their regulators following the Asian financial crisis in 1997. This study examines the relationship between board independence and board size with BPD performance. Indonesia was the suffering country when the crisis happened so this research will find interesting results, in terms the regional development banks (BPD).
The term 'independent' in independent commissioners or independent directors does not show that the other commissioners or directors are non-independent.
The term independent commissioners show their existence as the representative of independent shareholders (minority) as well as representing the interest of the investors.
The definition of Independent Commissioner is the member of the board of commissioners that is not affiliated with the directors, member of other board of commissioners, and the controlling shareholders, as well as independent from the business relations or other relations that may affect their ability to act independently or for the sake of the company's interest. In short, Independent Commissioners is the commissioners that do not have family relationships or business relationship with the directors as well as the shareholders. Basically, all commissioners are independent. It means that they have to be able to accomplish their task independently and see the interest of the company, and are free from any influence bearing the interest conflicting with the interest of the company.
These phenomena happened because the structure of the company ownership in Indonesia is still centralized. The position of the commissioner is assigned to a person and this assignment is not based on the competence and the professionalism of the person. Indeed, it is the reason for respect or appreciation that the loyalty is aimed at the party that has assigned the position of the commissioner. This position is usually given to the officer or to the former government official that has the certain influence to improve the bargaining power of the company in the government. It can be said that the selection of commissioners in the company in Indonesia has not considered the integrity as well as the competence of the recruited person. The independence of the board of the commissioner of the companies in Indonesia towards the directors or the shareholders is still in doubt. Therefore, the idea of the existence of Independent Commissioners appears.
The main idea of Independent Commissioners comes from the fact that most Commissioners became "the puppet" of the majority shareholders.
Independent Commissioner is required to represent the interest of the minority shareholders, and considering the condition of Indonesia, its existence has become necessary.
The term Independent Commissioners is similar to the term of independent directors in countries implementing the legal system of AngloSaxon. The different term is caused by two legal systems of different companies. The legal system of Anglo Saxon implements One Tier System that only owns one board of directors. In this system, it is then known the term of independent director as the party who controls the performance of the board of directors. While the legal system of Continental Europe implements Two Tiers System. There are two separated bodies in one management (board of directors). Both organs should be independent towards each other. The commissioners should be able to carry out independent supervisory function towards the directors. In the opposite, the directors should be able to independently manage the company on the daily basis without too much pressure from the Commissioners. Independent commissioners exist in two tiers system. Indonesia applies this system so that we know the term independent commissioners. The existence of Independent Commissioner in each BPD is expected to help BPD to achieve good corporate governance. It is also hoped that independent commissioner can be a bridge among the shareholders (province and regency with the board of directors). According to Ramdani & Witteloostuijn (2010) , there are two theories that concern with Corporate Governance; those are stewardship theory and agency theory. Stewardship theory was established on the philosophical assumption that humanly is essentially reliable, responsible, integrated, and truthful. In other words, this theory views management as a reliable entity that acts appropriately for the interest of the public in general and for the shareholders in particular. Meanwhile, agency theory views that the management cannot be trusted to do anything for the interest of the public and the shareholders. BPD is required to practice good corporate governance. Having the authority at the regional level, BPD can cover the potentials in the regions and thus can help the economic development of the areas. Previous studies have presented several differences between the independent commissioner and the banking performance. The results show that there are both positively and negatively significant and insignificant influences. Therefore, in the present study, we are trying to answer whether the board independence and board size can affect the performance of BPD. This paper structure will answer three question, firstly, the effect between board independence and BPD performance, secondly, the effect between board size and BPD performance, and lastly, the effect between the interaction of board independence and board size to BPD performance.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Corporate governance
Corporate governance is a management of a company that explains the relationship among participants of the company determining the direction and performance of the company (Monks & Minow, 2002) . According to the Forum of Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI), corporate governance is defined as a set of regulations that manage the relationship among the shareholders, stakeholders, creditors, governments, employees, as well as internal and external stakeholders that are bound to their rights and obligations to regulate and control the company. Added by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004), the definition of corporate governance is a set of regulations that establish the relation among the shareholders, the management of the creditors, government, employees, as well as internal and external stakeholders in accordance with their rights and obligations. In other words, it is a system that leads and controls the company. From the definitions, it can be concluded that the essence of corporate governance is an improvement of the company performance through the observation on the management performance and on the availability of the accountability of the management towards the stakeholders and other shareholders. In this case, the management is led to achieving the targets of the management and is not busy on things that are not included in the target of the management performance. Corporate governance means a company management that explains the relationship among a number of parties within the company that determine the vision and performance of the company. The appropriate practice of corporate governance or known as good corporate governance can help the shareholders to know the condition of the company through the disclosure of accurate, timely, and transparent financial performance. Indonesia follows the two-tier system in which there are Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors. Within the Board of Directors, the independent commissioner is the member and the main organ that is responsible for the practice of good corporate governance. Therefore, as the name implies, independent commissioners are required to be independent in their monitoring function, to practice professionalism, and to hold good leadership. Tulung & Ramdani (2016) argue the characteristics of the board in Indonesian regional development bank have influenced the performance.
While Tsene (2017) found that Greek company law provides traditionally for the establishment of the general duties of loyalty and care of all board members in companies limited by shares.
Agency theory
Jensen & Meckling (1976) initiated agency theory by redefining the agency relation among the shareholders (principal) and manager (agent). The model was based on the concentrated ownership. In this condition, the manager can have different interests from the shareholders. However, it has ever been stated by Berle & Means (1932) that Agency theory is based on the assumption of the existence of a separation between ownership and control in the concept of the modern company. Ownership focuses on the claim on the residual cash flow, while control focuses on the claim of voting right. The voting right, containing the legal content (the law that regulates the voting right of certain shares and another controlling mechanism), of agency theory is known as the core of corporate governance. Ronald Coase (1937) then developed it by developing a model of transaction cost economies. Nevertheless, it does not focus on the role of the human in the company. According to agency theory, the act of a manager can violate the interest of the shareholders. The manager's act is motivated by pecuniary benefits and non-pecuniary benefits. This deviant action of the manager is called an opportunistic (hyper-rational) or discreet behaviour. This argument shows that there usually occurs a conflict between the shareholder and the manager.
Board independence
Recent empiric studies on the board independence are so various that the results are still debatable. Baysinger & Bulter (1985) in their study on 266 firms in the US found that the proportion of independent commissioners positively influence the company's performance. It is supported by the findings of 
Board size
Board size is the number of board members in the company's organizational structure of banking, of which many researchers already studied and the results are varied; Yermack (1996) 
Interaction board independence and board size
The effect of board independence on firm performance may be dependent on the board size. The positive effect of board independence as the prediction of agency theory can be bigger if the board size is larger (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010) . This argument support by Lipton & Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) found that when boards expand beyond seven or eight executives, they are less likely to effectively control management. Lorsch (1997) suggests that a board size of 12 executives would lead to more effective.
H3: Interaction between board independence and board size has a positive influence on BPD performance. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This paper is to examine the relation between board independence and board size its effect on BPD performance. The sample firm consists all 26's BPD in Indonesia in the period 2010 -2014, we take secondary data from the annual report of each BPD, total 203 top executives that are a member of the board of commissioners and board of directors from all BPD in Indonesia. Board independence is independent commissioner in BPD. Board size is the number of executives sitting both on the board of commissioners and board of directors. (2007) . In our paper, we use ROA, ROE, and CAR for measure financial performance as a dependent variable for measures the BPD performance, and also we include capital adequacy ratio (CAR) because is normally to use for measure a banking performance. ROA is a useful measure of how well a bank executive is doing on the job because it indicates bank's assets are being used to make an income. ROA is defined as net income divided by the total asset. Besides ROA for measures the bank performance we need another measurement for bank performance, then ROE for supporting it because the owners care about most. They are really concerned about the bank earning on their equity investment that is measured by ROE, it defines as net income divided by capital. CAR was employed in this research as the dependent variable to measure the BPD performance because it is one of several indicators of healthy bank issued by the Bank of Indonesia. CAR is defined as capital divide by risk weight assets. Our independent variables are (a) the proportion of independent directors and (b) board size. The proportion of independent directors is the number of independent commissioners divided by a total number of the board. Board size is the number of executives sits on board including the board of commissioners and board of directors. Independent Commissioners is the member of the board of commissioners that is not affiliated with the directors and other board of commissioners, shareholders, etc. A control variable in this study is the size of the company that is determined by the value of the natural logarithm of the total assets of the company. The size of the company used as a control variable based on the premise that the large companies have the resources and greater financial resources and greater access flexibility in the acquisition of funds. With it enables large enterprises to create a better operational and financial performance than small companies are relatively limited both in terms of resources, sources of funds and access to fundraising. This table shows us the results of regression; board independence has the coefficient value of 0.001 with p-value of 0.01 in ROA, has the coefficient value of 0.006 with p-value 0.01 in ROE and coefficient value of 0.005 with p-value of 0.01 in CAR, the results lead to the acceptance of H1 so the relation of board independence and BPD performance is significantly positive. Moreover, the result suggests that independent commissioners depict inside control which helps to raise BPD Performance. This result supports the arguments Table 4 , reporting the interaction effects as to board independence and board size. The interaction of proportion independent commissioners and board size is positively significant to BPD performance in ROA (0.000 with < 0.01) and ROE (0.003 with < 0.01) and not significant in CAR (0.17, with p-value 0.1), this result leads to acceptance of H3.
RESULTS
CONCLUSION
Using a large sample of BPD in Indonesia from 2010-2014, we examine the influence of board independence, board size and the interaction between board independence and board size to BPD performance measure by return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and capital adequacy ratio (CAR). The sample employed all the members of the boards on BPD in Indonesia giving us a confidence in generalization our finding. The statistical method used to test the hypotheses is OLS regression, this method was used to measure the relationship between board independence, board size, and BPD performance. Firstly, the proportion of independent commissioners with ROA, ROE, and CAR then control by total asset, secondly, board size and BPD performance with ROA, ROE and CAR then control by total asset, and lastly, interactions between board independence and board size to BPD performance. The thesis contributes to the literature related to board independence, board size and firm performance in the regional development banks in Indonesia. The results suggest that there is a positive relationship between board independence and board size to BPD performance. This means that independent commissioners play a vital role in improving the performance of banks. According to the results of this study, independent commissioners play an important role in providing independent recommendations during corporate decision-making process to directors and positively enhance overall good corporate governance. This finding supports the results from Baysinger The additional results are the interaction of board independence and board size and the results are about a positive impact on the BPD performance, this means that the larger board size the performance will be better than the smaller board size. Although this research has answered the questions, there were some limitations and shortcomings. Firstly, the data is limited to Regional Development Bank and could be developed to more broad that include all banks in Indonesia, so the result would be more interesting and can describe the corporate governance in Indonesian banking. Secondly, the length of the year could be more add, it would be better for 10 years and we can use a data panel for a measure that data. So, in the future research, we suggest adding more variables to make more interesting finding such as the characteristics and composition of the board.
